



AN APPROXIMATION TO THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF 20th CENTURY CHINA

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**This article is part of the BA dissertation “Off The Record: Two Visual Analyses on the Cultural Revolution and their Implication for Chinese International Relations” and is part 1 out of 3 publications.*

For many historians, the 20th century was the culmination of many of the war and political conflicts initiated by European countries during the 18th and 19th centuries. The 20th century witnessed two world wars, a holocaust, and multiple wars of independence between European powers and their corresponding colonies in the southern hemisphere. Counting the first two alone, it is estimated that a total of between 65 and 100 million deaths resulted¹.

But in China, the 20th century is considered one of the darkest periods of its history; where it is estimated that hundreds of millions perished within the country alone.

The history of twentieth century China can be seen as a series of catastrophes endured and inflicted, a chain of dramatic social events with an enduring influence on great segments of Chinese society. A few historical reference points²: after the end of the Qing Dynasty in 1911 and the birth of the Chinese republic, a power struggle among rival groups ensued, leading to civil war from 1927 to 1949³, which resulted in thirteen million Chinese deaths. These years also saw the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945)⁴, which killed three million soldiers and over eighteen million civilians. Ninety-five million people fled or were displaced. The Communist victory in 1949 and the foundation of the People’s Republic of China brought the country only a new series of catastrophes. Mao Zedong and the Communist Party of China were responsible for the deaths of seventy million people⁵. The Great Leap Forward of 1959-62⁶ produced the greatest famine in human history, with an estimated thirty to forty million deaths. Then came the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966-76).

¹ *La Segunda Guerra Mundial a profundidad | Enciclopedia del Holocausto.* (s. f.). United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. <https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/es/article/world-war-ii-in-depth>

² Pläankers, T. *Landscapes of the Chinese Soul: The Enduring Presence of the Cultural Revolution, Cultural Revolution and cultural regression.* Routledge, 2018.

³ Nava, M. (2019a, agosto 13). *Guerra civil china (1927–1949).* LHistoria. <https://www.lhistoria.com/china/guerra-civil-china>

⁴ Nava, M. (2019b, agosto 16). *Segunda guerra sino-japonesa (1937–1945).* LHistoria. <https://www.lhistoria.com/china/segunda-guerra-sino-japonesa#:~:text=La%20Segunda%20guerra%20sino%2Djaponesa.china%20tras%20la%20rendici%C3%B3n%20japonesa>

⁵ Pläankers, T. *Landscapes of the Chinese Soul: The Enduring Presence of the Cultural Revolution, Cultural Revolution and cultural regression.* Routledge, 2018.

⁶ *Great Leap Forward | Definition, Facts, & Significance.* (s. f.). Encyclopedia Britannica. <https://www.britannica.com/event/Great-Leap-Forward>

In short, the Cultural Revolution of China was a political, social, and cultural upheaval launched by Chinese leader, Mao Zedong (1893 - 1976)⁷, to renovate the spirit of the Chinese Revolution and to prevent the country from entering a political decline similar to that of the Soviet Union after the 1917 Revolution⁸. Lasting a total of ten years, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution gives shape to Chinese history under Communist rule, forcing its division into three phases: before, during, and after⁹.

1. THE STRUGGLE FOR MODERNITY

Prior to the launch of the Revolution, it is important to keep in mind that the chain of tragedies befalling the Chinese people is the result of an internal reaction to an international status quo that China was eager to achieve since the end of the 19th century, with the fall of its last dynasty: the Qing (1644 - 1912)¹⁰. The 19th century saw a profound change in Chinese self-perception¹¹: the arrival of European political thought brought to China the idea of the nation-state, and many Chinese needed to come to terms with the fact that the old China was gone, and that the new one would need to assert its place in the hierarchy of nations. The introduction of Western 'modernity' into Chinese reality was the trigger of an identity crisis that plunged China into a relentless pursuit for 'progress'. The development of modernity in the Western world was underpinned by a set of assertions, many of which are still powerful today, about the organization of society¹². The traditional bonds that the self had to the wider community were broken down; modern societies did not support the old feudal hierarchies of status and bondage, but rather, broke them down in favor of equality, or at any rate, a non-hierarchical model of society¹³. This point was extremely difficult for the Chinese, as it challenged the traditional Confucian structure with a new concept of secular individualism. Confucianism is based on

⁷ *Biografía de Mao Tse-tung*. (s. f.). Biografías y Vidas. <https://www.biografiasyvidas.com/biografia/m/mao.htm>

⁸ Orlando Fígues / Locución: Caterina Miloro. (2022, 23 febrero). *Historia National Geographic*. National Geographic: Historia. España. https://historia.nationalgeographic.com.es/a/revolucion-rusa-1917_16494

⁹ Plänkner, T. *Landscapes of the Chinese Soul: The Enduring Presence of the Cultural Revolution*, Cultural Revolution and cultural regression. Routledge, 2018.

¹⁰ History.com Editors. (2022, 14 marzo). *Qing Dynasty*. HISTORY. <https://www.history.com/topics/china/qing-dynasty>

¹¹ Mitter, R. *Modern China: A very Short Introduction*. Oxford University Press. 2016, p10.

¹² Ropp, P. S. (2010). *China in World History*. Oxford University Press UK. <https://elibro-net.eu1.proxy.openathens.net/es/lc/ufv/titulos/167296>

¹³ Just, P. & Monaghan, J. (2000). *Social and Cultural Anthropology: A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford University Press UK. <https://elibro-net.eu1.proxy.openathens.net/es/lc/ufv/titulos/168585>

ideas of mutual obligation, maintenance of hierarchies, a belief in self-development, education, and improvement, and, above all, an ordered society¹⁴.

Likewise, Western political influence did change China profoundly in the late 19th century in the wake of the Opium Wars, when concepts such as nationalism and Social Darwinism became hugely influential on a generation of Chinese who felt that their country was now vulnerable to the outside world¹⁵.

In the wake of the Chinese Republic, with very few exceptions, all of the warring factions that vied over China's future in the 20th century were 'modern', not just in the sense of being recent, but in their rejection or adaptation of the Confucian norms of the past. Their obsession was the embrace of a new set of norms derived from outside, but which were adapted to make 'Chinese' and 'modern' compatible, rather than terms which seemed to be in opposition to one another¹⁶.

One of the most significant cultural shifts in the reforms came in 1905, with the abolition of the almost thousand-year-long tradition of examinations in the Confucian classics to enter the Chinese Bureaucracy¹⁷, marking the first step towards the secularization of the Chinese political class. All the same, political thinkers turned to a variety of -isms, such as liberalism, socialism, and anarchism, and also sought inspiration in a variety of foreign examples to justify the beginning of a new era in Chinese thought and action, initiated in the Chinese Revolution of 1911. Most general histories have been highly dismissive of the last decades of Qing rule, regarding it as a period when a corrupt dynasty that refused to adapt to a new and hostile world was finally overthrown. For years, Marxist Chinese historians viewed the period as 'feudal' and argued that its overthrow set the stage for a new 'modern' era that would eventually usher in the rule of the CCP¹⁸. To many, the Chinese Republic and its weakened political principle

¹⁴ <https://asiasociety.org/education/confucianism>

¹⁵Ropp, P. S. (2010). *China in World History*. Oxford University Press UK. <https://elibro-net.eu1.proxy.openathens.net/es/lc/ufv/titulos/167296>

¹⁶Mitter, R. *Modern China: A very Short Introduction*. Oxford University Press. 2016, p16.

¹⁷ Dongfeng, T. Xiaobin, Y. y Roberts, R. (2009). *Chinese revolution and Chinese literature*. Newcastle upon Tyne, U.K, Cambridge Scholars Publishing. Recuperado de <https://elibro-net.eu1.proxy.openathens.net/es/lc/ufv/titulos/125116>

¹⁸ Lawrance, A. (2002). *China Under Communism*. Taylor & Francis Group. <https://elibro-net.eu1.proxy.openathens.net/es/lc/ufv/titulos/160830>

were a mockery to the ideal of ‘Chinese modernization’¹⁹. Thus, the ‘ism’ which mostly emerged at this time and would later become dominant was, of course, communism.

At the same time, there is a sort of chimerical element to the quest of modernity. Modernity – as every other conceptual idea ever developed – is never endingly changing, and Chinese conceptions of it change as well: the modernity of the ‘self-strengtheners’ who sought to adapt Western technology in the late Qing is not the same as that of the radicals who declared a ‘new culture’ in the 1910s, nor of the Nationalists and Communists whose primary goal was to find a stable, modern identity for the Chinese state and people²⁰.

As mentioned before, the history of politics in 20th century China has more often than not been told as a narrative of conflict: one that has been particularly shaped by the conflict between the Nationalists under Chiang Kaishek and the Communists under Mao Zedong. Still, the possibility remains to treat the period from the establishment of Chiang’s Nationalist government in 1928 to the present day as one, long modernizing project by two parties that agreed as well as disagreed²¹.

The only difference among the two parties remains to this day to be the belief from the side of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) that none of the modernization goals within Chinese society, especially rural reform, can be achieved without major class warfare. In many ways, the Nationalists under Chiang, and the Communists, eventually led by Mao, had much in common. Both parties saw themselves as revolutionary, and both would swiftly conclude that their revolutions had come grinding to a halt. It was their similarity of intention, in part, that made their rivalry so deadly²².

In this sense, it could be said that it was an unsatisfied pursue for modernity and international acceptance – along with terrible wartime conditions encouraging corruption, black marketeering, and hyperinflation²³ –, what contributed to the failure of Chiang Kaishek’s republican government on behalf of Mao’s victory by the time China was plunged into yet

¹⁹ Mitter, R. *Modern China: A very Short Introduction*. Oxford University Press. 2016, p32.

²⁰ Ídem, p16.

²¹ Ídem, p40.

²² Lawrance, A. (2002). *China Under Communism*. Taylor & Francis Group. <https://elibro-net.eu1.proxy.openathens.net/es/lc/ufv/titulos/160830>

²³ Mitter, R. *Modern China: A very Short Introduction*. Oxford University Press. 2016, p48.

another war, the Civil War between the Communists, and the Nationalists (1946 – 49)²⁴. The Chinese government, despite its problems and its lack of popular mandate, had made a momentous decision: China could - and should - become involved in international conflicts²⁵. The huge disillusionment with Nationalist rule meant that many who were not Marxists by inclination welcomed a Communist victory simply because they felt that the Nationalists had no credibility left²⁶.

Opposite to it, Mao Zedong's political credibility had been greatly boosted through the Long March²⁷ (1934 - 35) as well as his advocacy of revolution that spoke directly to the peasantry and not to a Soviet-backed policy of urban revolution²⁸. As American journalist Edgar Snow spoke on Mao: "He had the simplicity and naturalness of the Chinese peasant, with a lively sense of humor and a love of rustic laughter... he combined curious qualities of naivete with incisive wit and worldly sophistication"²⁹. It was thanks to his unprecedented charisma and conviction in front of the Chinese people, that Mao's China gained much greater control over its population than any other government that had preceded in decades. Its politics was essentially modern, in that it demanded mass participation in which the citizenry, the 'people' saw itself as part of a state project based on a shared class and national identity. The success of Mao's military and political tactics also meant that the country was, for the first time since the 19th century, united under a strong central government³⁰.

And through it, the urgency of the CCP to modernize China resurfaced; this time deeply influenced by Mao's premise of 1927: "Revolution is not a dinner party... it cannot be so refined, so leisurely, and gentle, so temperate, kind, courteous, restrained, and magnanimous. A revolution is an insurrection, an act of violence by which one class overthrows another"³¹. Both the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution were implemented under these

²⁴ Nava, M. (2019a, agosto 13). *Guerra civil china (1927–1949)*. LHistoria. <https://www.lhistoria.com/china/guerra-civil-china>

²⁵ Mitter, R. *Modern China: A very Short Introduction*. Oxford University Press. 2016, p33.

²⁶ Sorace, C., Franceschini, I., & Loubere, N. (Eds.). (2019). *Afterlives of Chinese Communism: Political Concepts from Mao to Xi*. ANU Press. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctvk3gng9>

²⁷ History.com Editors. (2018, 21 agosto). *Long March*. HISTORY. <https://www.history.com/topics/china/long-march>

²⁸ Mitter, R. *Modern China: A very Short Introduction*. Oxford University Press. 2016, p50.

²⁹ Ídem, p52.

³⁰ Brown, J., & Johnson, M. D. (Eds.). (2015). *Maoism at the Grassroots: Everyday Life in China's Era of High Socialism*. Harvard University Press. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1c84chm>

³¹ Mitter, R. *Modern China: A very Short Introduction*. Oxford University Press. 2016, p56.

notions, fueled by a strong belief that social and political will were capable of producing the miracles that even capitalism had proven incapable of a revolution that reached all corners of society. The rhetoric that flowed from the Cultural Revolution showed that not only was this a movement of great ideological conviction, but one that, despite its seeming rationality, reflected a particular type of modernity very strongly³².

On top of this, during the mid-1960s a growing political and social conformity was taking place within Chinese society, due to the fact that the first generation was coming of age that had never known life prior to the CCP's rule. This ignorance of poverty and warfare was beginning to give way to newer notions inside Chinese culture, resembling the processes of social and cultural openness and growth within Western generations in the aftermath of the First and Second World War. This forgetfulness of generational pain and revolutionary ideals, was the determining factor that led Mao Zedong to launch a massive campaign of ideological renewal in order to avoid further social deterioration and thus the collapse of the political system (as later happened in the Soviet Union, a reference model in the early years of Chinese communism). Just as Stalin had characterized the job of Party-sponsored artists in the USSR to be 'the engineers of human souls', so the Cultural Revolution was meant to provide a retooling of Chinese society to become a renewed, self-aware citizenry finally free from the shackles of the past. Thus, after a period of withdrawal in the post-famine years, Mao took the helm again with the Cultural Revolution. This new upheaval was required, he thought, to break up the inertia of established political relationship³³.

During the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution society was split into 'true revolutionaries', 'supporters of Mao Zedong thought', and reactionary forces, 'demons and serpents'³⁴, against which the harshest measures were justified. The radical pursue of eliminating what the CCP designated as the Four Olds - Old ideas, Old culture, Old customs, and Old habits³⁵ - gave a progressive disguise into what became a deeply regressive group process where the whole intellectual class was largely eliminated. Regression was now the norm in China: regression in

³² Li, X. (2001). *The Chinese Cultural Revolution Revisited*. *China Review*, 1(1), 137–165.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/23461931>

³³ Pläänkers, T. *Landscapes of the Chinese Soul: The Enduring Presence of the Cultural Revolution*, Cultural Revolution and cultural regression. Routledge, 2018.

³⁴ Ídem

³⁵ Harding, H. (1980). *Reappraising the Cultural Revolution*. *The Wilson Quarterly* (1976-), 4(4), 132–141.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/40256005>

relationship form; regression in the affective situation; regression in the level of psychic integration³⁶. The practical results were the annulation of inhibitions against violence and an extensive collapse of government structures: an anomic condition of society where the individual was fully disconnected from its social and familiar surroundings³⁷. Revolution gave way to insurgency, which led to violence and ultimately resulted in uncontrolled and unconditional terror. The climate of persecution was prolonged for over ten years, the brutalization of social intercourse, torture and murder, constant danger, and the loss of autonomy over personal life choices quickly made it impossible to differentiate between victims, perpetrators, and witnesses alike³⁸. “Of the forty-five to sixty-five million deaths that can be credibly laid at Maoism’s door, an estimated five to seven million take place in the first three years of the Cultural Revolution”³⁹.

2. KEYS TO UNDERSTANDING TRADITIONAL CHINESE SOCIETY

Throughout the course and development of the phenomenon that was the Cultural Revolution, two key concepts determined the reaction of the Chinese people from different social sectors upon this unprecedented national anomaly: the sense of contingency rooted in their cultural tradition, and the Confucian morality.

On the one hand, the concept of contingency is characterized by a double concession: the thing at hand is not necessary, need not exist, yet it is also not impossible⁴⁰. In Western culture, more linked to Christian metaphysical tradition, contingency responds to the initial idea that “the whole world is the creation of a freely acting god who could also have not bothered to bring it into being”⁴¹. Nowadays, in the postmodern era, contingency is established from the view that no higher order can be detected from the world: all things respond to the accidental product of

³⁶ Plänkner, T. *Landscapes of the Chinese Soul: The Enduring Presence of the Cultural Revolution*, Cultural Revolution and cultural regression. Routledge, 2018.

³⁷ *The Sociological Definition and Implications of Anomie*. (2019, 2 julio). ThoughtCo. <https://www.thoughtco.com/anomie-definition-3026052>

³⁸ Li, X. (2001). The Chinese Cultural Revolution Revisited. *China Review*, 1(1), 137–165. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23461931>

³⁹ Hahl, R. *Landscapes of the Chinese Soul: The Enduring Presence of the Cultural Revolution*, Chapter 3. Red terror: the experience of violence during the Cultural Revolution. Routledge, 2018.

⁴⁰ Wang, L. & Holzinger, M. *Landscapes of the Chinese Soul: The Enduring Presence of the Cultural Revolution*, Chapter 2. The Great Proletarian Revolution (1966 - 1976) as an experience of contingency. Routledge, 2018.

⁴¹ Wang, L. *Landscapes of the Chinese Soul: The Enduring Presence of the Cultural Revolution*, Chapter 2. The Great Proletarian Revolution (1966 - 1976) as an experience of contingency. Routledge, 2018.

nature and its arbitrariness. Contrary to this, Chinese philosophy attaches much less importance to metaphysics. Even so, there have been many times in history where Chinese thinkers, through the concept of “fate” - be it in folk religion, the religion of Heaven, Buddhism, or humanities⁴² - have been able to tackle the fact of contingency or unpredictable reversals by linking divine consequences to human action. Call it worship of natural objects (folk religion), virtue (religion of Heaven), harmony (universalism), or existence of self-determination (fatalism), etc.; the Chinese individual has always had an active role and a profound notion of personal responsibility towards the events that unfold around them. This understanding of the workings of the universe linked to their good social and political behavior, among others, explains the passive attitude of those who suffered the most in the years of the Cultural Revolution. It is not surprising that in the face of such unmanageable chaos, many people assumed a universalist fatalism, where they conceived that human actions depended solely on fate and were not the results of any self-determination on their behalf.

On the other hand, Confucian morality constitutes the very being of China: for more than 2,000 years, a set of social and political assumptions, which found their origins in the ideas of Confucius, a thinker of the 6th century BCE, shaped Chinese statecraft, and everyday behavior⁴³. By adopting these norms, people of any grouping could become ‘people of the dynasty’ - that is, Chinese. This point is extremely important, in position to shed light on some of the questions surrounding the violence developed by the famous Red Guards of the cultural revolt. What began as an academic and intellectual insurgency among the youth, soon turned into a wave of uncontrolled and lewd violence towards teachers, parents and elders, until it progressively descended into a systematic and random purge among adult political factions. In China at the onset of the Cultural Revolution (and, to some extent, still today), a strict seniority principle prevails. Older people demand unlimited respect, which younger ones show by suppressing any impulse to criticize⁴⁴. This unbreakable duty to obey is a variant of filial piety, one of the main pillars in Confucianism. This duty to obedience, carried forward under Communism, binds parents to their progeny (and, analogically, teachers to their students) in a love-hate relationship. If the fear of adult authority weakens, the heretofore suppressed

⁴² Wang, L. *Landscapes of the Chinese Soul: The Enduring Presence of the Cultural Revolution*, Chapter 2. The Great Proletarian Revolution (1966 - 1976) as an experience of contingency. Routledge, 2018.

⁴³ Dongfeng, T. Xiaobin, Y. y Roberts, R. (2009). *Chinese revolution and Chinese literature*. Newcastle upon Tyne, U.K, Cambridge Scholars Publishing. Retrieved from <https://elibro-net.eu1.proxy.openathens.net/es/lc/ufv/titulos/125116>

⁴⁴ Hauh, R. *Landscapes of the Chinese Soul: The Enduring Presence of the Cultural Revolution*, Chapter 3. Red terror: the experience of violence during the Cultural Revolution. Routledge, 2018.

rebelliousness is released⁴⁵. The Cultural Revolution, offered during its early years, the possibility of a role reversal: being disobedient to the parental generations while being obedient to Mao as the nation's main father figure made possible for youngsters to violate filial piety without fear of punishment. By making himself a charismatic figure, Mao Zedong intended from the start to occupy this psychic position in the minds of his countrymen. As his own mortality loomed, he promoted a cult of personality that was supposed to set him above all earthly criteria, including moral ones⁴⁶.

3. THE SILENCED AFTERMATH?

In the aftermath of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, no one had much to say. Or, rather, no one ought to have much to say. After Mao Zedong's death in October 1976, the Party politicians who succeeded him aimed to establish a clear end to the Revolution and to attack any loose ends that might lead to later outbreaks of revenge and greater violence beyond what had already been experienced. Again, the CCP decided to follow the Soviet example, where intra-Party conflicts were always defined as the struggle between 'two lines': a correct one, represented by the great leader Lenin and his follower Stalin, and the erroneous line of Party enemies⁴⁷. One of the first and foremost attempts to bring closure to the ten-year span that was the Revolution, came with the 1981 Party Resolution⁴⁸: where Mao Zedong was assigned the central role of the Cultural Revolution. This resolution attempted to shield Mao from popular resentment by acknowledging his errors but assessing them as marginal in relation to his achievements, without resulting in an exercise of blame. Neither could Mao Zedong be assigned the role of chief culprit, as Jiang Qing - Mao's wife - tried to do in her defense at the trial; the dethronement of this absolute leader, the Founder of the People's Republic, the creator of Mao Zedong Thought, would also endanger social stability⁴⁹.

⁴⁵ Hauh, R. *Landscapes of the Chinese Soul: The Enduring Presence of the Cultural Revolution*, Chapter 3. Red terror: the experience of violence during the Cultural Revolution. Routledge, 2018.

⁴⁶ Lifton, J. R. *Revolutionary Immortality: Mao Tse Tung and the Chinese Cultural Revolution*. New York, Random House, 1968.

⁴⁷ Gentz, N. *Landscapes of the Chinese Soul: The Enduring Presence of the Cultural Revolution*, Chapter 1. Negotiating the past: narratives of the Cultural Revolution in party history, literature, popular media, and interviews. Routledge, 2018.

⁴⁸ David S. G. Goodman. (1981). The Sixth Plenum of the 11th Central Committee of the CCP: Look Back in Anger? *The China Quarterly*, 87, 518–527. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/653602>

⁴⁹ Gentz, N. *Landscapes of the Chinese Soul: The Enduring Presence of the Cultural Revolution*, Chapter 1. Negotiating the past: narratives of the Cultural Revolution in party history, literature, popular media, and interviews. Routledge, 2018.

The population at large was too applied the division into “good” and “bad”. People in general - the masses - had been misused and manipulated by the leadership; they were innocent and belonged to God⁵⁰. Individuals were freed from personal responsibility in order to regain people’s trust and to secure their active cooperation in a new modernization project. The greatest conflict in this perception of the Chinese population - still to this day - is the simplification of the masses as a unified, immature mass, blatantly contradicting the then still formally acknowledged division of people into classes with specified backgrounds⁵¹. Such a bipolar model left no room for political debates outside the scope of the Party. One example was the promotion of the so-called Scar Literature, a forum in which Chinese citizens with traumatic experiences could come forward and describe the events, officially supported by the Party and the propaganda apparatus, so long as it remained within the limits set in the resolution⁵². The conformity of the community to reshape their urge to bear witness to their experiences within a given model shows once again a strong cultural imprint within Chinese moral character even after attempting to erase it.

There has been no official engagement with the Cultural Revolution since 1989. Many viewed the Democracy Movement of 1989 as a consequence derived from Scar Literature⁵³, although there haven’t been any official studies to sustain it, and the CCP has since made bigger and bigger efforts to keep the Cultural Revolution out of sight and mind for fear of a new breakout of violence or worse, a new Cultural Revolution. If contemporary China is, nonetheless, defensive about this part of its history, this reflex might have to do with both aspects of the Janus-faced Cultural Revolution⁵⁴: on the one hand with the scarcely bearable traumatic experiences, and on the other with the uncomfortable fact that this was China’s first youth revolt, which swept like a storm across the country and taught fear to many of the rulers of the day.

⁵⁰ Ídem

⁵¹ Li, X. (2001). The Chinese Cultural Revolution Revisited. *China Review*, 1(1), 137–165.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/23461931>

⁵² Dongfeng, T. Xiaobin, Y. y Roberts, R. (2009). *Chinese revolution and Chinese literature*. Newcastle upon Tyne, U.K., Cambridge Scholars Publishing. Recuperado de <https://elibro-net.eu1.proxy.openathens.net/es/lc/ufv/titulos/125116>

⁵³ Daiyun, Y. & Wakeman, C. *To the Storm. The Odyssey of a Revolutionary Chinese Woman*. Berkley, CA, University of California Press. 1985.

⁵⁴ Pläankers, T. *Landscapes of the Chinese Soul: The Enduring Presence of the Cultural Revolution*, Cultural Revolution and cultural regression. Routledge, 2018.



But even so, the remark of American philosopher George Santayana, often cited in the context of German history and the Holocaust, has obvious application to recent Chinese history as well: ‘Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it’⁵⁵.

⁵⁵ Ídem

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